

Convex Team Logics

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
Workshop on the Occasion of Marco Degano's Doctoral Defense

Plan for the talk

- Convexity: What is it and why is it interesting?
- Team Logics: Connectives and notions of propositionhood.
- Results: Expressive completeness for convex team logics.

Convexity: the why and what

Degano, 2024: *The underlying idea is that the meaning of expressions should denote a **convex** 'region' provided a suitable notion of meaning space. **Convexity would be violated when gaps are present** in the underlying 'region' that expressions denote.*




convex



not convex

Image from Gärdenfors, *The Geometry of Meaning: Semantics Based on Conceptual Spaces*, 2000



Convexity as Linguistic/Cognitive Universal

1. Generalized quantifiers:

Barwise & Cooper, 1981: *The simple NP's of any natural language express monotone quantifiers or **conjunctions of monotone quantifiers**.*

Van Benthem, 1984: *Monotonicity is a strong condition, whose validity for arbitrary logical constants is debatable. Nevertheless, one does expect a certain "smooth" behaviour of reasonable quantifiers; and, therefore, the following notion of **continuity [ed: convexity]** has a certain interest. . .*

2. Concept formation:

Gärdenfors, 2000: *A central feature of our cognitive mechanisms is that we assign properties to the objects that we observe [...] I primarily want to pin down the properties that are, in a sense, natural to our way of thinking [...] The third and most powerful criterion of a region is the following, which also relies on betweenness: A subset C of a conceptual space S is said to be **convex** if, for all points x and y in C , all points between x and y are also in C .*

Convexity as Linguistic/Cognitive Universal

3. Indefinites:

Degano, 2024: *We can then provide a more grounded explanation for the absence of indefinites that lexicalize only the SK and NS functions as a **violation of the convexity constraint**.*

Definition (Convexity over Teams)

A set of teams \mathcal{P} is **convex** iff for all t, t', t'' such that $t \subseteq t' \subseteq t''$, if $t \in \mathcal{P}$ and $t'' \in \mathcal{P}$, then $t' \in \mathcal{P}$.

(Propositional) team logics: connectives

Traditionally (in, e.g., CPC), formulas φ are evaluated at **single valuations**
 $v : \mathbf{Prop} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$,

$$v \models \varphi.$$

In team semantics, formulas φ are evaluated at **sets ('teams') of valuations**
 $t \subseteq \{v \mid v : \mathbf{Prop} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}\}$,

$$t \models \varphi.$$

Definition (some team-semantic clauses)

For $t \subseteq \{v \mid v : \mathbf{Prop} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}\}$, we define

$t \models p$	iff	$\forall v \in t : v(p) = 1,$
$t \models \varphi \wedge \psi$	iff	$t \models \varphi$ <i>and</i> $t \models \psi,$
$t \models \varphi \vee \psi$	iff	there exist t', t'' such that $t' \models \varphi;$ $t'' \models \psi;$ and $t = t' \cup t'',$
$t \models \varphi \wp \psi$	iff	$t \models \varphi$ <i>or</i> $t \models \psi.$

New connectives

On connectives:

Fact 1: Team semantics for $\{\neg, \wedge, \vee\}$ gives us **classical logic**.

Fact 2: In classical logic, $\{\neg, \wedge, \vee\}$ is famously **functionally complete**: all other connectives are definable by these.

Fact 3: In team semantics, $\{\neg, \wedge, \vee\}$ can only capture a fraction of the expressible connectives. For example, \bowtie is not definable using $\{\neg, \wedge, \vee\}$.


Consequence: We have a semantic framework for expressions beyond classical assertions, such as questions.

Take-away: *Teams provide for ways to express meanings not readily expressible in single-valuation semantics; and thus for **considering new connectives!***

(Propositional) team logics: propositionhood

- Given any condition-based semantics, we obtain a notion of propositionhood defined as a set of conditions. *Slogan:* **Proposition = a set of conditions.**
- In team semantics, conditions are teams.
- So, **propositions are sets of teams.** **Caveat:** The standard terminology is not ‘propositions’ but ‘properties’.

Example



Since our meaning space now has structure (as powersets), we can consider natural restrictions on what a proposition is. Or what **different kinds of propositions/meanings** there are! For instance, assertions contra questions. (Note the analogy with generalized quantifiers.)

Notions of propositionhood (closure properties)

Take-away: Teams provide for ways to express meanings not readily expressible in single-valuation semantics; and thus for *considering new notions of propositionhood!*

Definition (some restrictions on propositionhood)

ϕ is <i>downward closed</i> :	$[s \models \phi \text{ and } t \subseteq s] \implies t \models \phi$
ϕ is <i>union closed</i> :	$[s \models \phi \text{ for all } s \in S \neq \emptyset] \implies \bigcup S \models \phi$
ϕ has the <i>empty team property</i> :	$\emptyset \models \phi$
ϕ is <i>flat</i> :	$s \models \phi \iff \{v\} \models \phi \text{ for all } v \in s$
ϕ is <i>convex</i> :	$[s \models \phi, u \models \phi \text{ and } s \subseteq t \subseteq u] \implies t \models \phi$

Convexity generalizes downward closure:

$$\text{downward closed} \implies \text{convex}$$

Interface of connectives and propositionhood

The choice of connectives and the corresponding notion of propositionhood are closely connected. Here are some examples:

- Classical formulas are flat (so union closed) [i.e., classical assertions are flat]
- Formulas with \sqcup might not be union closed. [i.e., questions are not union closed]
- Consider the *epistemic might* operator \blacklozenge , defined as

$$s \models \blacklozenge\phi \iff \exists t \subseteq s : t \neq \phi \ \& \ t \models \phi.$$

Formulas with \blacklozenge are not downward closed [i.e., epistemic uncertainty is not persistent]

Convexity

Recall Degano, 2024: *The underlying idea is that **the meaning of expressions** should denote a convex 'region' **provided a suitable notion of meaning space***

To summarize, we paraphrase: *The underlying idea is that $\|\varphi\|$ should denote a convex 'region': **if $s, u \in \|\varphi\|$ and $s \subseteq t \subseteq u$, then $t \in \|\varphi\|$***

Expressive completeness

We answer an open question concerning the expressive power of a certain propositional team logic by showing it is capable of capturing the full range of **convex and union-closed** propositions (properties). We also find logics capable of expressing all **convex** propositions.

We say a logic L is **expressively complete** for a class of properties \mathbb{P} ($\|L\| = \mathbb{P}$) if

- (i) $\|L\| \subseteq \mathbb{P}$: each property $\|\phi\|$ (where $\phi \in L$) is in \mathbb{P}
- (ii) $\mathbb{P} \subseteq \|L\|$: each property $\mathcal{P} \in \mathbb{P}$ can be expressed by a formula of L : $\mathcal{P} = \|\phi\|$ where $\phi \in L$.

Example: Propositional dependence logic is expressively complete for the class of **downward-closed (propositional) team properties**

$$\mathbb{D} = \{\mathcal{P} \mid [t \in \mathcal{P} \ \& \ s \subseteq t] \implies s \in \mathcal{P}\}$$

Propositional inquisitive logic is also expressively complete for \mathbb{D} .

We consider one propositional logic complete for the class of **convex and union-closed (propositional) team properties**

$$\mathbb{CU} = \{\mathcal{P} \mid [[s, u \in \mathcal{P} \ \& \ s \subseteq t \subseteq u] \implies t \in \mathcal{P}] \ \& \ [s, u \in \mathcal{P} \implies s \cup u \in \mathcal{P}]\}.$$

This logic is the propositional fragment of Aloni's **Bilateral State-based Modal Logic**.

We also consider two logics complete for the class of **convex (propositional) team properties**

$$\mathbb{C} = \{\mathcal{P} \mid [s, u \in \mathcal{P} \ \& \ s \subseteq t \subseteq u] \implies t \in \mathcal{P}\}.$$

These logics are (in a sense) convex variants of the downward-closed logics propositional dependence logic and propositional inquisitive logic.

A Logic for Convex Union-closed Properties

Syntax of **classical propositional logic (with \vee)** \mathbf{PL}_\vee

$$\alpha ::= p \mid \perp \mid \neg\alpha \mid \alpha \wedge \alpha \mid \alpha \vee \alpha$$



We extend \mathbf{PL}_\vee with the **nonemptiness atom** \mathbf{NE} —syntax of $\mathbf{PL}_\vee(\mathbf{NE})$:

$$\phi ::= p \mid \perp \mid \neg\alpha \mid \phi \wedge \phi \mid \phi \vee \phi \mid \mathbf{NE}$$



where $\alpha \in \mathbf{PL}_\vee$.

$$\begin{aligned} \{v_q\} &\models p \vee q; \\ \{v_q\} &\not\models (p \wedge \mathbf{NE}) \vee (q \wedge \mathbf{NE}) \end{aligned}$$

$$t \models \mathbf{NE} \iff t \neq \emptyset$$

Aloni's (2022) **Bilateral State-based Modal Logic** is a modal extension of $\mathbf{PL}_\vee(\mathbf{NE})$ (and is similarly complete for convex union-closed modal team properties in the modal setting). Aloni uses \mathbf{NE} to model a process of pragmatic enrichment which is then used to account for free choice inferences and other phenomena. E.g.,:

You may have coffee or tea \rightsquigarrow You may have coffee and you may have tea.

$$\diamond((c \wedge \mathbf{NE}) \vee (t \wedge \mathbf{NE})) \models \diamond c \wedge \diamond t$$

To show $\mathbf{PL}_V(\mathbf{NE}) = \mathbf{CU}$, we show:

(i) $\|\mathbf{PL}_V(\mathbf{NE})\| \subseteq \mathbf{CU}$: by induction.

(ii) $\mathbf{CU} \subseteq \|\mathbf{PL}_V(\mathbf{NE})\|$: by constructing **characteristic formulas** for properties in \mathbf{CU} .

Characteristic formulas for valuations and teams:

$$\chi_v := \bigwedge \{p \mid v \models p\} \wedge \bigwedge \{\neg p \mid v \not\models p\}$$

$$w \models \chi_v \iff w = v$$

$$\chi_s := \bigvee_{v \in s} \chi_v$$

$$t \models \chi_s \iff t \subseteq s$$

Characteristic formulas for flat (downward- and union-closed) properties:

$$t \models \bigvee_{s \in \mathcal{P}} \chi_s \iff t \subseteq \bigcup \mathcal{P}$$

Characteristic formulas for upward-closed properties:

$$t \models \bigwedge_{v_1 \in t_1, \dots, v_n \in t_n} (((\chi_{v_1} \vee \dots \vee \chi_{v_n}) \wedge \mathbf{NE}) \vee \top) \iff \exists s \in \mathcal{P} = \{t_1, \dots, t_n\} : s \subseteq t$$

Characteristic formulas for convex union-closed properties:

$$t \models \bigvee_{v \in s} \chi_v \wedge \bigwedge_{v_1 \in t_1, \dots, v_n \in t_n} (((\chi_{v_1} \vee \dots \vee \chi_{v_n}) \wedge \mathbf{NE}) \vee \top) \iff \exists s \in \mathcal{P} = \{t_1, \dots, t_n\} : s \subseteq t \text{ and } t \subseteq \bigcup \mathcal{P}$$

$$\iff t \in \mathcal{P} \text{ (if } \mathcal{P} \in \mathbf{CU})$$

Logics for Convex Properties

To get a characteristic formula for all convex properties, we can replace the characteristic formula for **flat properties** with a characteristic formula for **downward-closed properties**.

Flat (downward- and union-closed) properties:

$$t \models \phi_{\mathcal{P}}^F \iff t \subseteq \bigcup \mathcal{P}$$

Upward-closed properties:

$$t \models \phi_{\mathcal{P}}^U \iff \exists s \in \mathcal{P} : s \subseteq t$$

Downward-closed properties:

$$t \models \phi_{\mathcal{P}}^D \iff \exists s \in \mathcal{P} : t \subseteq s$$

Convex union-closed properties:

$$\begin{aligned} t \models \phi_{\mathcal{P}}^F \wedge \phi_{\mathcal{P}}^U &\iff \exists s \in \mathcal{P} : s \subseteq t \text{ and } t \subseteq \bigcup \mathcal{P} \\ &\iff t \in \mathcal{P} \text{ (if } \mathcal{P} \in \mathbb{CU}) \end{aligned}$$

Convex properties:

$$\begin{aligned} t \models \phi_{\mathcal{P}}^D \wedge \phi_{\mathcal{P}}^U &\iff \exists s_1 \in \mathcal{P} : s_1 \subseteq t \text{ and } \exists s_2 \in \mathcal{P} : t \subseteq s_2 \\ &\iff t \in \mathcal{P} \text{ (if } \mathcal{P} \in \mathbb{C}) \end{aligned}$$

Can we simply extend $\mathbf{PL}_\vee(\text{NE})$ to get $\phi_{\mathcal{P}}^D$? No. It can be shown that if a logic L can define $\|\phi \vee \psi\|$ for all convex ϕ, ψ (notation: $\mathbb{C} \vee \mathbb{C} \subseteq \|\!|L\|\!$), then $\|\!|L\|\! \not\subseteq \mathbb{C}$ (the logic cannot be convex!)

For instance, let $\mathcal{P}_1 := \{\{v_1\}, \{v_2, v_3\}\}$ and $\mathcal{P}_2 := \{\{v_1\}\}$. Then $\mathcal{P}_1, \mathcal{P}_2 \in \mathbb{C}$, so $\mathcal{P}_1 = \|\phi_1\|$ and $\mathcal{P}_2 = \|\phi_2\|$ for $\phi_1, \phi_2 \in L$. We have $\|\phi_1 \vee \phi_2\| = \{\{v_1\}, \{v_1, v_2, v_3\}\} \notin \mathbb{C}$, so if $\mathbb{C} \vee \mathbb{C} \subseteq \|\!|L\|\!$, then $\|\!|L\|\! \not\subseteq \mathbb{C}$.

We had \vee in $\mathbf{PL}_\vee(\text{NE})$, but $\mathbf{PL}_\vee(\text{NE})$ can only define $\phi \vee \psi$ for all convex *and union-closed* ϕ, ψ ; this does not violate convexity. $\mathbb{CU} \vee \mathbb{CU} \subseteq \|\!|L\|\!$ need not imply $\mathbb{C} \vee \mathbb{C} \subseteq \|\!|L\|\!$.

We must either (1) modify \vee to force convexity, or (2) replace \vee with something else (that still allows us to capture all of classical propositional logic). Recall that [propositional dependence logic](#) and [propositional inquisitive logic](#) are complete for \mathbb{D} and hence can express $\phi_{\mathcal{P}}^D$. We employ strategy (1) to produce a convex extension of propositional dependence logic, and (2) to produce a convex logic similar to propositional inquisitive logic.

Convex Propositional Dependence Logic

Syntax of **propositional dependence logic** $\mathbf{PL}_\vee(= (\cdot))$:

$$\phi ::= p \mid \perp \mid \neg\alpha \mid \phi \wedge \phi \mid \phi \vee \phi \mid = (p_1, \dots, p_n, q)$$

where $\alpha \in \mathbf{PL}_\vee$. $\|\mathbf{PL}_\vee(= (\cdot))\| = \mathbb{D}$, so $\|\phi_{\mathcal{P}}^D\| \in \|\mathbf{PL}_\vee(= (\cdot))\|$.

We modify \vee to force downward closure, and hence convexity. We also replace NE with the epistemic might operator \blacklozenge to still be able to express $\phi_{\mathcal{P}}^U$.

Syntax of **classical propositional logic (with \forall)** \mathbf{PL}_\forall :

$$\alpha ::= p \mid \perp \mid \neg\alpha \mid \alpha \wedge \alpha \mid \alpha \forall \alpha$$

Syntax of **convex propositional dependence logic** $\mathbf{PL}_\forall(= (\cdot), \blacklozenge)$:

$$\phi ::= p \mid \perp \mid \neg\alpha \mid \phi \wedge \phi \mid \phi \forall \phi \mid = (p_1, \dots, p_n, q) \mid \blacklozenge\phi$$

where $\alpha \in \mathbf{PL}_\forall$.

$$t \models \phi \forall \psi \iff \exists s \supseteq t : s = s_1 \cup s_2 \ \& \ s_1 \models \phi \ \& \ s_2 \models \psi$$

$$t \models \blacklozenge\phi \iff \exists s \subseteq t : s \neq \emptyset \ \& \ s \models \phi$$

For downward-closed ϕ, ψ : $\phi \vee \psi \equiv \phi \forall \psi$, so $\|\phi_{\mathcal{P}}^D\| \in \|\mathbf{PL}_\forall(= (\cdot), \blacklozenge)\|$. We can define χ_t using \forall , and define $\phi_{\mathcal{P}}^U$ for $\mathcal{P} = \{t_1, \dots, t_n\}$ by: $\phi_{\mathcal{P}}^U := \bigwedge_{v_1 \in t_1, \dots, v_n \in t_n} \blacklozenge(\chi_{v_1} \forall \dots \forall \chi_{v_n})$.

A Convex Logic Similar to Propositional Inquisitive Logic

Syntax of **classical propositional logic** (with \rightarrow) $\mathbf{PL}_{\rightarrow}$:

$$\alpha ::= p \mid \perp \mid \alpha \wedge \alpha \mid \alpha \rightarrow \alpha$$

Syntax of **propositional inquisitive logic** $\mathbf{PL}_{\rightarrow}(\vee)$:

$$\phi ::= p \mid \perp \mid \phi \wedge \phi \mid \phi \rightarrow \phi \mid \phi \vee \phi$$

$$t \models \phi \rightarrow \psi \iff \forall s \subseteq t : s \models \phi \text{ implies } s \models \psi$$

$$t \models \phi \vee \psi \iff t \models \phi \text{ or } t \models \psi$$

Like \mathbf{PL}_{\vee} , $\mathbf{PL}_{\rightarrow}$ is flat, and corresponds to standard classical propositional logic. We define $\neg_i \phi := \phi \rightarrow \perp$. $\phi \vee_i \psi := \neg_i(\neg_i \phi \wedge \neg_i \psi)$. Using these, we can construct χ_t as before. $\|\mathbf{PL}_{\rightarrow}(\vee)\| = \mathbb{D}$, and $\phi_{\mathcal{P}}^D$ is definable as

$$\phi_{\mathcal{P}}^D := \bigvee_{t \in \mathcal{P}} \chi_t$$

We again add the epistemic modality \blacklozenge to capture $\phi_{\mathcal{P}}^U$:

$$\phi_{\mathcal{P}}^U := \bigwedge_{v_1 \in t_1, \dots, v_n \in t_n} \blacklozenge(\chi_{v_1} \vee_i \dots \vee_i \chi_{v_n}) \quad (\mathcal{P} = \{t_1, \dots, t_n\})$$

Problem: with \blacklozenge and \forall , the logic is no longer convex. If $\mathbb{C} \forall \mathbb{C} \subseteq \|\mathbb{L}\|$, then $\|\mathbb{L}\| \not\subseteq \mathbb{C}$. E.g., $\blacklozenge p \forall q$ is not convex.

Solution: We can have $\mathbb{F} \forall \mathbb{F} \subseteq \|\mathbb{L}\|$ (where \mathbb{F} is the class of flat properties) and hence $\|\phi_{\mathcal{P}}^D\| = \|\bigvee_{t \in \mathcal{P}} \chi_t\| \in \|\mathbb{L}\|$ without having \forall in the syntax. In fact, \forall is already uniformly definable for flat ϕ, ψ using \rightarrow and \blacklozenge .

Syntax of $\mathbf{PL}_{\rightarrow}(\blacklozenge)$:

$$\phi ::= p \mid \perp \mid \phi \wedge \phi \mid \phi \rightarrow \phi \mid \blacklozenge \phi$$

For any $\{\alpha_k \mid k \in K\} \subseteq \mathbf{PL}_{\rightarrow}$,

$$\bigvee_{k \in K}^- \alpha_k := \bigwedge_{k \in K} ((\bigwedge_{j \in K \setminus \{k\}} \blacklozenge \neg \alpha_j) \rightarrow \alpha_k).$$

Then $\bigvee_{k \in K}^- \alpha_k \equiv \bigvee_{k \in K} \alpha_k$. We can define $\phi_{\mathcal{P}}^U$ as before, and $\phi_{\mathcal{P}}^D$ as:

$$\phi_{\mathcal{P}}^D := \bigvee_{t \in \mathcal{P}}^- \chi_t$$

Conclusion

- Importance of convexity.
- Notion of propositionhood in team logics.
- Results: $\mathbf{PL}_V(\mathbf{NE})$ is expressively complete for convex and union-closed properties. A modal analogue of the result shows that Aloni's BSMML is expressively complete for modal convex and union-closed properties.
- Results: Two logics expressively complete for all convex properties. One is similar to propositional dependence logic, the other to propositional inquisitive logic.

Thank you!